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I thank Hannu Salonen for useful discussions. 1 Introduction
Dating back at least to Harsanyi (1974), coalitional solutions have been crit-
icized for not being able to take into account counterfactuals. That is, in
answering satisfactorily - without ad hoc assumptions - what will happen
once a coalitional action has taken place. Should a deviation be followed by
further deviations? Uncertainty of this leads to a well known prediction prob-
lem: the deviant coalition may not know what the consequence, and hence
the protability, of its deviation is. This criticism has given borne to an
important literature on the logic of coalitional behavior (for an illuminating
exposition of this literature, see the recent work by Rey, 2006).
The problem is that, as the players should know what the modeler does,
the players should anticipate any further future deviations following the ini-
tial deviation. Since the players are only concerned about the outcome that
is to be implemented, they need to have a theory in mind what will the
sequence of deviations be. Thus given such theory, there is an indirect dom-
inance relation between outcomes where an outcome is dominated if there is
a coalition that prefers blocking given the outcome that will be implemented
after the deviation. The solution concept should be robust against such far-
sighted deviations. Since the theory of deviations is build into the theory, it
is not clear how such modelling should be conducted. Qualitatively di¤erent
solution concepts are obtained. The problem is particularly acute when the
core is empty - which is often the case - and one is forced rely on equilibrium
reasoning, in particular the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solution.
It is clear that the solution should re ect dynamic consistency in the sense
of dynamic non-cooperative solution concepts. The key problem is, however,
that the coalitional set up is not a proper non-cooperative game. The crucial
di¤erence is that the order of coalitional moves is typically not well specied.
Any attempt to do this has seems to lead to either ad hoc assumptions of
what is feasible for coalitions and what is not, or to indeterminacy problems.
The desiderata one would want to put on succesful solutions are at least: (i)
a solution should not force coalitions to accept an unacceptable outcome and
(ii) the coalitions should be able to reconsider their choices subject to the
past behavior. Putting together, at the heart of the matter is a commitment
problem: the decision of stopping the game can potentially be reversed at
any stage of the game.
Many ¤arsighted solutions have been suggested in the literature. In par-
ticular, Harsanyi (1974) and Chwe (1994) analysed stable set with indirect
dominance as the blocking criterion. One problem is that the solution often
fails to exist. Another is that indirect dominance is also subject to a sec-
ond degree credibility problem. Namely there is no way to ensure that the
1coalitions in the middle follow the dominance path, especially if a deviation
is protable.1
One of the most useful conceptual systems is due to Chwe (1994). His
framework allows description of coalitional game form in the sense that what
may happen after a coalitional move is built into the structure of the game.
The framework permits many interpretations, including classical cooperative
games, networks, clubs, etc.. Chwe*s system is, however, di¢cult to analyze
as it is a graph without a clear recursive structure. His solution, the largest
consistent set, has been used widely (e.g. Page et al, 2005) even though it has
been argued to be too permissive (Xue, 1998). However, sharper solutions
have consistently su¤ered from existence problems (see e.g. Barbera and
Gerber 2007).
This paper develops a new coalitional solution in the framework of Chwe
(1994). The solution is based on two observations: (i) The underlying game
structure of coalitional games is isomorphic to simple recursive games; innite
horizon games in which only one player moves at a time and all players*
payo¤s depend on the node at which the play is stopped by the moving player.
Analyzing such games by noncooperative means is the appropriate way to
guarantee farsightedness of the decision makers and internal consistency of
the model. (ii) The existing results on recursive games are insu¢cient: it is
not known whether an equilibrium in recursive games exist nor even what is
the appropriate solution concept. Our aim is to ll this gap and, a fortiori,
suggest a contradiction-free foundation for coalitional games.
The natural solution concept for this class of games is the one deviation
principle: after any history should a moving coalition not want to make a one
time deviation to his strategy. The property is not derived as consequence
of other dynamic solution concepts but rather it is taken as the primitive. It
can be interpreted as a consequence of a computational constraint: players
are suggested their equilibrium strategies on which they can compute any
number of changes but not innitely many changes.
We show that a strategy meeting the criterion that always implements an
outcome in nite time exists for any Chwe-game with nitely many physical
outcomes. The equilibrium play paths are characterized and the equilibrium
outcomes specied. The equilibrium characterization is based on iterative
application of a majorization operations, familiar from the social choice lit-
erature.
Finally, we compare the solution with the largest consistent set of Chwe.
It is shown that the one-deviation solution is always contained by the largest
1Aumann and Maschler (1974) is another older attemtp to solve the commitment prob-
lem.
2consistent set. We also relate our model to Xue*s (1998) solution which is
based on the same primitive idea of comparing blockings over paths rather
than outcomes. It is shown that the two solutions bear much similarities.
However, to my knowledge the existence of Xue*s solution can be guaranteed
only in special cases. Finally we interpret the results in a general framework
of Konishi and Ray (2003) where blocking takes place in real time. We show
that our model can be interpreted as an extension of theirs.
Other recent contributions include Vanneltbosch at el. (2008), Barbera
and Gerber (2001), Diamantoudi and Xue (2007). Greenberg (1991) gives a
useful taxonomy of the principles that govern strategic behavior. This paper
has been inspired by this approach.
2 Coalitional game
A coalitional game due toChwe(1994) is dened by the list ¡=h Q>[>(IV)VµQ>(%l)l2Qi,
where Q is the nite set of players, [ is the nonempty nite set of vertices
or nodes, the action set IV : [ ! 2[ species the set of actions IV({) µ [
available to coalition V µ Q at node { 2 [=2 We assume { 2 IV({) for all {
and for all V= Each player l 2 Q has a preference relation %l over the set of
outcomes [=
Using the language of cooperative game theory, one might interpret an
outcome { to be the description of a coalition structure, as well as a vector of
payo¤s accruing to each player. In noncooperative games in strategic form,
an outcome would represent a prole of actions taken in the stage game.
The Chwe-game is played in the following manner: There is the initial
status quo {¤= At any stage w =0 >1 >===> the outcome {w is the current status
quo. The status quo can be changed by a coalition. Only one coalition may
be active at a time. If coalition V is active and chooses | 2 IV({w) nf { w g >
then | becomes the new status quo at stage w +1 . If | = {w, then {w is
implemented.
The reason for why only one coalition may be active at a time is that
game is meant to describe the coalition formation process. If the activity
of a coalition V is to induce activity from the the part of other coalitions,
then that should be re ected by the graph ([>(IV)VµQ)= They should be
interpreted as the primitive of the model, game form, and the activation
plan of the coalitions as their strategy which should, presumably, meet the
desired stability properties.
2Chwe (1994) does not assume nite outcome space.
3Paths A path i sa nite sequence ({0>===>{ N) 2[ 1
n =1[n such that
{n+1 2 IV({n) nf { n gfor some V, for all n =0 >===>N> and {N 2 ]. The
length of the path ({0>===>{ N) is N; the number of its edges= A path is ab-
breviated by an upper bar above a typical node: ¹ { =( { 0 >===>{ N)=Denote by
¹ [ the set of all paths.
Our notational conventions concerning paths are: Generic components of
¹ {, ¹ |> and ¹ } are denoted { >| , and }> respectively. The path that is obtained
by truncating ¹ { =( { 0 >===>{ N) 2 [ at the nth step is ¹ {n =( { 0 >===>{ n)=
The path that is obtained by joining a truncated path ¹ {n =( { 0 >===>{ n)and
a path ¹ | =( | 0 >===>| O) is ¹ {n¹ | =( { 0 >===>{ n>| 0>===>| O). Then also ¹ {n¹ |o¹ } =
({0>===>{ n>| 0>===>| o>} 0>===>} P)>where ¹ } =( } 0 >===}P)> and so forth=
Strategies Denote the set of nonterminal histories by
K := f({0>V 0>{ 1===>V W¡ 1>{ W):{
¤={ 0and {w+1 2 IVw({w)> for all w · W and W =0 >===g=
Dene by function V : K ! 2Q the activation plan of coalitions. Then
coalition V(k>{)is active after history (k>{)>for any (k>{)2K=A coalitional
strategy  is conditional on history (k>{)2Ksuch that (k>{)2I V( k>{)({)=
Let 0(k>{)= ( k>{) and w(k>{)= w ¡ 1 ( k>{>(k>{))> for all w =1 >=== .
Denote by ¹ (k) the sequence of nodes induced by strategy  from history k
onwards:
¹ (k)=( 
0 ( k ) >
1(k)>===)
If there is W such that W(k)= W +1(k), then ¹ (k>{ 0)=( { 0 >===>{ W)where
{w = w(k)> for w =0 >===>W=
Denote the nal element of the path ({0>===>{ N)by [({0>===>{N) ]={ N=
We say that the strategy  is well dened if [¹ (k)] exists for all k 2 K, i.e.,
an outcome is implemented in nite time after any history. Then [¹ (k>{)]
is the outcome implemented when a well dened strategy  is followed after
history (k>{)>and  [¹ (k>{>d)] is the outcome that becomes implemented if
coalition V chooses action d 2 IV({) and  is followed thereafter:
[¹ (k>{>V>d) ]=
½
 [¹ (k>{>V>|)]> if d = | 6= {>
{> if d = {= (1)
In particular, if d = (k)> then [¹ (k>d) ]= [¹ (k)]=
Solution We use the notation: for any V µ Q> and {>|2[>
| ÂV { if | Âl {>for all l 2 V>
4and
| %V { if | %l {>for all l 2 V, and | Âm { for some m 2 V=
Our focus is on agents that can compute in nite time which outcome will
become implemented give the players* strategies. Hence we conne attention
on strategies that are well dened. Our equilibrium condition is the following.
Denition 1 (One-Deviation Property) A well dened strategy (>V)
satises the coalitional one-deviation property if (k>{)={implies V(k>{)=
Qand
[¹ (k>V>d)] ¨V [¹ (k)]> for all d 2 IV({)> for all V µ V(k), for all k 2 K>=
That is, after any history, a single coalition is active. The active coalition
nor any of its subcoalition can make a single deviation that is protable for
all coalition members given the continuation play. Note that implementation
of an outcome requires that the active coalition is the grand coalition the
grand coalition.
Our aim is to characterize equilibrium behavior and prove the existence
of an equilibrium meeting the one-deviation property. The collection of equi-
librium paths
¹ (K)=f ¹ {:¹  ( k )=¹ {> for some k 2 Kg
is our main object of our study. The collection also denes the set of outcomes
that are implementable via a nitely long deviation to  by the operation
[¹ (K)]= The initial status quo may a¤ect the eventual outcome that will
become implemented in the maximal set of implementable outcomes but not
the set itself.
3 Characterization
Farsighted players should anticipate further movement and care only of the
nal outcome (see Harsaynyi, 1974). A feasible path re ects a potential play
path, given the starting status quo {0. The nal outcome is the potentially
implemented outcome. We will work in terms of feasible paths. Denote by
¹ [ the collection of all feasible paths in [=
Denition 2 (Coalitional Dominance) A path ¹ | 2 ¹ [ dominates a path
¹ { 2 ¹ [ at the nth step, denoted by ¹ | Bn ¹ {> if {n+1 6= |0 if there is V such
that |0 2 IV({n) and, for any such V> there is an V0 such that V0 µ V>
{n+1 2 IV0({n)> and [¹ |] ÂV0 [¹ {]=
5That is, if outcome {n is reached along the feasible chain {> then there
is a player who participates an active coalition at {n that rather joins a new
coalition that benets from path ¹ | more than path ¹ {, provided that the end
points of them are reached. The key feature of the denition is that an
active coalition V0 can be blocked only by a subcoalition V µ V0= Note that
if { =( { 0 >===>{ q)dominates ¹ | and q =0 >then [¹ {]={ 0 .
Dene paths that begin from node | by
¹ [| = f¹ | 2 ¹ [ : |0 = |g=
Denition 3 (Consistent Collection of Paths) A consistent collection
of paths FFS µ ¹ [ satises:
(i) For any { 2 [> there is ¹ { 2 FFS such that { = {0=
(ii) For any ¹ { 2 FFS> there is no |>V> and n such that ¹ | Bn ¹ { for all
¹ | 2 FFS such that |0 = |.
That is, for any initial status quo node, there is a feasible path in the con-
sistent collection that answers how the play will evolve. Finally, if a player
whose turn it is to move deviates from the path, then there is a path in ¹ \
starting from the new node that does not improve the deviating player*s pay-
o¤ relative to what he would get if the original path is followed= A consistent
collection of paths thus describes a stability property: any deviation from a
stable play path can be credibly punished.
Now we establish that a consistent collection of paths characterizes equi-
librium behavior, i.e., that any collection of equilibrium paths is equivalent
to a consistent collection of paths.
L e m m a4Let a well dened  satisfy the one-deviation property. Then
¹ (K) i saFFS.
Proof. (i). Find a path ({0>===>{n)such that {n = {. Then ¹ ({0>===>{n¡1>{)2
¹ (K).
(ii). Take any (k>{ 0) 2 K and the equilibrium path ¹ (k>{ 0)={= Let
| 2 IV({n) nf { n +1g for any V µ V(k>{ 0)= Since V chooses in equilibrium
{n+1 rather than |, there is a path ¹ | =¹  ( k>{ n>|) that V does not strictly
prefer over the equilibrium path ¹ {, i.e. [¹ |] 6ÂV [¹ {].
Now we show the converse - that for any consistent collection of paths
there exists a well dened strategy meeting the one-deviation property. Let
¹ \ be a consistent collection of paths. Identify a function ! on ¹ \ £ [ £ N
6such that !({>|>n)=¹ |2¹ \and |0 = |, ¹ | / Bn{ whenever | 2 I({n)nf{ n +1g=
Since FFS satises Condition ??, such function exists.
Fix a consistent collection of paths FFS. Construct a strategy (¤ : i>T)
where ¤ species the action, T is the set of states on which the strategy
operates, and i i satransition function from T £ [ to T= Let
T = ft
¹ { :¹ {2FFSg> (2)
be a set of states summarizing histories in K as follows: For any sequence
¹ { =( { 0 >===) 2 K> let the transition function i satisfy, for any n =0 >===>
i(t
¹ {>{ 0>===>{ n>|)=
½
t ¹ { > if | = {n+1>
t!({>|>n)> if | 6= {n+1= (3)
Proceeding this way for all { 2 [> and for all n =0 >1 >===> each element of K
is allocated into one element of T=







{ n +1> if {n+1 exists>
{n> if {n+1 does not exist= = (4)
That is, the strategy calls the moving player to continue along the path
¹ { =( { 0 >===>{ N)and implement {N when the end of the path is reached.
L e m m a5Strategy ¤ is well dened and satises the one-deviation prop-
erty.
Proof. Starting from {0 = {¤> recursive application of (3) and (4) and the
construction of T imply that  is well dened.
To check the one-deviation property, take any ¹ { =( { 0 >===)= For any n> a
deviation to | 2 I({n) nf { n +1g> induces a path !({n>|>n)=¹ }such that
}0 = | and ¹ } / Bn¹ {= By the denition of dominance, [¹ {] ÂL({n) [¹ }]= T h u sa
unilateral deviation to | is not protable for player L({n)=
By Lemmata 4 and 5, a well dened equilibrium strategy induces behavior
consistent with a consistent collection of paths and behavior in any consistent
collection of paths can be supported by a well dened equilibrium strategy.
We compound these observations in the following characterization.
T h e o r e m61. For any well dened strategy  satisfying the one-deviation
property there is a consistent collection of paths FFS such that ¹ (K)=
FFS.
2. For any consistent collection of paths FFS there is a well dened 
satisfying the one-deviation property such that FFS =¹  ( K ) .
7This result does not, however, tell anything about the existence of a
consistent collection of paths nor how it can be identied. The next section
provides an algorithm for identifying the maximal consistent collection of
paths. Hence it also guarantees the existence of a solution.
3.1 Existence
The aim of this subsection is to prove that a consistent collection of paths
and, á fortiori, that a well dened equilibrium strategy exists. For this we
need to dene the following relation between paths and nodes. The concept
is inspired by its cousin in the social choice literature (cf. Fishburn, 1977;
Miller, 1980; Dutta, 1988, or Laslier, 1991). Let ¹ E be subset of [=
Denition 7 Path ¹ { is pseudo-covered in ¹ E via node | if there is n such
that ¹ | Bn ¹ { for all ¹ | 2 ¹ [| \ ¹ E. If, moreover, ¹ { 2 ¹ E> then ¹ { is covered in ¹ E
via |=
That is, a feasible path ¹ { is pseudo-covered in ¹ E of paths if, at some node
{n> the moving player L({n) cannot lose by deviating from the path ¹ { to node
|, given the hypothesis that the continuation play belongs to the set ¹ E. If,
furthermore, ¹ { itself is an element of ¹ E> then ¹ { is said to be covered in ¹ E=
Denote by XF(¹ E) the uncovered set of ¹ E> i.e. the set of parths not
covered in ¹ E. By construction, XF(¹ E)µ ¹ E=
We now strengthen of the uncovered set -concept by iterating the uncovered-
operator until no paths are left to be covered. The ultimate uncovered set
XXF is dened recursively as follows. Set XF0 = ¹ [> and let XFw+1 =
XF(XFw)> for all w =0 >===. Then XF1 is the ultimate uncovered set. XF1
is nonempty only if XFw is nonempty for all w. Let XF1 := XXF=
Before we establish the existence of the ultimate uncovered set XXF> we
reduce the complexity of information hidden in dominance relationships.
Denition 8 (Dominance Class) A dominance class G(\>|) of paths is in-
dexed by a pair (\>|)22 [£]= Path ¹ { =( { 0 >===>{N) belongs to a dominance
class G(\>|) if (f{ng>[¹ {] )=( \>|).
A dominance class contains all the relevant information concerning domi-
nance: If two paths ¹ { and ¹ {0 belong to the same dominance class, then ¹ | Bn ¹ {
for some n if and only if ¹ | Bn0 ¹ {0 for some n0; the length of the path or how
many times it cycles in the middle does not matter. Since [ i sa nite set,
and ] µ [, the number of dominance classes is nite. Dominance classes
partition the set of paths ¹ [=
8We say that a dominance class G(\>|) subsumes a dominance class G(\ 0>|0)
if | = |0 and \ 0 µ \= Let G(\>|) subsume G(\ 0>|0)= Take ¹ { 2 G(\>|) and
¹ {0 2 G(\ 0>|0)= Then, for any ¹ |> ¹ | Bn ¹ { for some n whenever ¹ | Bn0 ¹ {0 for some
n0= The following result is an immediate corollary of this observation.
L e m m a9If the dominance class containing ¹ { subsumes the dominance
class containing ¹ {0> then ¹ { is pseudo-covered in XFw if ¹ {0 is pseudo-covered
in XFw, for all w =0 >=== .
Since { is subsumed by any path from which one has simply removed
all cycles, if { is not pseudo-covered in XFw then any acyclic path that it
subsumes is not pseudo-covered in XFw. Now we state the main result of the
paper.
Lemma 10 For any w =0 >===> if ¹ { 2 XFw such that {0 = {, then there is
¹ | 2 XFw+1 such that |0 = {.
Proof. First, index all the nodes in [ with natural numbers. Further,
index all paths of ¹ [ such that of any two paths, the longer always has a
higher index. Since [ contains nitely many elements, such indexing can be
performed.3
The proof is by contradiction. By assumption, there is an acyclic ¹ { 2
XF0 such that {0 = {= Suppose that w is the rst stage at which the lemma
does not hold true= Then ¹ { is pseudo-covered in XFw= Construct recursively
a sequence ¹ |0> ¹ |1>=== of paths as follows:
Let ¹ { =¹ | 0 . Given ¹ |q>q=0 > 1 >===> let nq be the r s ts t e pa tw h i c h¹ | q
is pseudo-covered and let { be the node with the smallest index among the
nodes via which ¹ |q is pseudo-covered at nq. Let ¹ {q be the one with the
smallest index among all ¹ { 2 XFm such that {0 = {. Since the lemma holds
for stages smaller than w, such ¹ {q exists. By Lemma 9, ¹ {q is acyclic and
hence its length is at most j[j. Finally, let ¹ |q+1 =¹ | q
n q ¹ { q =(See Figure 1 for
an example of paths ¹ |0>===> ¹ |7> each starting from {)




n > for all ¹ y =( y 0 >===>yN)= It is easy to see that (y0>===>y N) A
(y0
0>===>y 0
























F i g u r e1
We now develop a characterization of a path ¹ |q in terms of the acyclic
paths ¹ {0>===> ¹ {q¡1= The pseudo-covering steps n0>n 1>=== 2 N are well dened
by the sequence ¹ |0>=== . For any q =0 > 1 >===> determine recursively a set of
indeces V = fv0>===gµf 0 >===>qg: Let
v0 = arg min
v2f0>===>qg
nv
and, given v0>===>v m>
v m+1 = arg min
v2fvm>===>qg
nv> for all m =0 >= = == (5)
Then there is t · q such that vt = q and
nv0 ?= = =?n v t=
For example, in Figure 1, q =2implies V = f0>1>2g> and q =6implies
V = f0>3>5>6g= Writing g0 = nv0 and gm = nvm ¡ nvm¡1 for all m ¸ 1, permits
us to express the path ¹ |q+1 =¹ | v t +1 as
¹ |
vt+1 =¹ { g 0¹ {
v 0




Since t · q> (5) and (6) imply more generally that
¹ |
vm+1 =¹ { g 0¹ {
v 0
g 1 ===¹ {
vm¡1
gm ¹ {
vm> for all m =0 >===>t= (7)
10The rst step nvm at which ¹ |vm is pseudo-covered is now nvm = g0 + === + gm=
The node at which this takes place is |
vm
nvm=
Now we prove the contradiction via a series of subclaims.
Claim 1. The sequence ¹ |0>==== does not have a top element, i.e., for all
q =0 >1 >===> the path ¹ |q is pseudo-covered in XFw.
Proof : Suppose, to the contrary, that the sequence ¹ |0>=== has a top ele-
ment ¹ |p. Since the lemma hold s for steps smaller than w> and since ¹ |p is
not pseudo-covered in XFw, it must be the case that ¹ |p 2 XFw= Since ¹ |p is
not covered in XFw> in fact, ¹ |p 2 XFw+1= But { = {0 = |p
0 contradicts the
assumption that the lemma does not hold true at stage w.
Claim 2. The length of paths ¹ |0>=== is uniformly bounded by j[j
2.
Proof: Let, to the contrary of the claim, ¹ |q+1 be a path with the length
N higher than j[j
2 = Decompose ¹ |q as in (6):
¹ |
q+1 =¹ { g 0¹ {
v 0




Since ¹ |q0 consists of t truncated paths ¹ {v whose length before truncation is
at most j[j> it must be that t¢j[j¸N . By assumption, N ¸j [ j
2+1=Thus




nvo for some 0 · o>p·t
and vo ?v p =By (7),
¹ |
vp+1 =¹ { g 0¹ {
v 0




But vo ?v pcontradicts the assumption that g0 + === + go + === + gp is the
r s ts t e pa tw h i c h¹ | q pis pseudo-covered (since ¹ |qp is pseudo-covered also
at step g0 + === + go).
Claim 3. There is a set of paths f¹ }0>====> ¹ }sg in which the sequence ¹ |0>===
ends up cycling.
Proof: By Claim 1, ¹ |0> ¹ |1>=== is an innite sequence. By construction, at
the qth step the transition from ¹ |q to ¹ |q+1 is contingent only on ¹ |q= Since
the length of paths ¹ |0> ¹ |1>=== is uniformly bounded by Claim 2, and hence
the paths are drawn from a nite set, we can view ¹ |0>=== as a (deterministic)
nite state Markov process. Interpreting f¹ }0>====> ¹ }sg as the ergodig set of the







0 Ȝ 0 z z  
F i g u r e2
Claim 4. The assumption that the lemma does not hold true at stage w
is not true.
Proof: By Claim 3, let the steps at which ¹ }0>====> ¹ }s are pseudo-covered
be o0>===>os> respectively. Assume that o¤ = mino=0>===>s oo= By construction,
¹ }0>====> ¹ }s agree up to step o¤> from which onwards they diverge into at least
two branches. Let f0>===> tgµf 0 >===>sg be the (unique) indexation such





all m =0 > = = ==Since the ordering ¹ }0>====> ¹ }s> ¹ }0 is derived from the pseudo-
covering operation, ¹ }

o¤+1 Bo¤ ¹ }m¡1 for all m ·  · m+1 ¡ 1> and m =1 >===>t>
and ¹ }

o¤+1 Bo¤ ¹ }t¡1> for all  · 0 ¡ 1 or t · . By chaining the coalitional
dominance relations, for any Vm such that }
m¡1
o¤+1 2 IVm(}o¤) t h e r ei saV 0
mµ
V msuch that }
m
o¤+1 2 IV0
m(}o¤)= Thus, after xing V0 there is a sequence of
nonempty coalitions V0 ¶ V1 ¶ ==== such that for any * = m[modt], it holds
that }
*¡1
o¤+1 2 IVm(}o¤). Since all coalitions are nonempty, there l 2 Vm for all
m =0 > 1 > = = ==Then, by the denition of dominance, [¹ }] Âl [¹ }m¡1] for all
m ·  · m+1 ¡ 1 and m =0 >===>t¡1=Moreover, [¹ }] Âl [¹ }t¡1]> for all
 · 0¡1 or t · . But this violates the transitivity of Âl> a contradiction.
Now we argue that the ultimate uncovered set is a well dened concept.
Lemma 11 There is W?1such that XFW =XXF=
12Proof. By Lemma 9, all paths in the same dominance class become covered
at the same covering round w. Since there are nitely many dominace classes,
the number of covering rounds to reach XXF must be nite=
By induction, Lemma 10 implies that if ¹ } is covered in XFw, then ¹ } is in
XFW such that {0 = |0= The following corollary generalizes this idea.
Corollary 12 For any w =0 >===> if ¹ { 2 XFw such that {0 = {, then there is
¹ | 2 XXF such that |0 = {.
By construction, no element in XXF i sc o v e r e di nXXF. Now we prove
that XXF satises the two properties of consistent collection of paths.
Theorem 13 XXF is a consistent collection of paths.
Proof. (i). By assumption, there is ¹ { 2 XF0 such that {0 = {= By Corollary
12, there is ¹ | 2 XXF such that |0 = {.
(ii). By the construction of XXF> ¹ { 2 XXF is not covered in XXF= Thus
there is no | 2 I({n) nf { n +1g such that ¹ {n¹ | Bn ¹ {> for all ¹ | 2 XXF such
that |0 = |=
By Theorem 13 (i), since [ is nonempty, XXF cannot be empty.
Corollary 14 XXF is nonempty.
The next result shows that XXF is the (unique) maximal consistent col-
lection of paths in the sense of set inclusion=
Theorem 15 XXF contains any consistent collection of paths.
Proof. Let ¹ E be a consistent collection of paths. Take any ¹ { 2 ¹ E= Since ¹ {
satises part (ii) of the denition of consistent collection of paths, it follows by
the denition of coveringin ¹ [ that ¹ { 2 XF([)=XF1=Since ¹ { was arbitrary,
¹ E µ XF1= By the denition of covering in XF(¹ [)> ¹ E 2 XF(XF1)=XF2=
Again, ¹ E µ XF2= By induction, ¹ E µ XFW =: XXF= Since XXF is a con-
sistent collection of paths, it is the maximal consistent collection of paths.
Collecting Theorems 6 and 13, we have characterized possible equilibrium
play paths and outcome that are implementable with any equilibrium.
Corollary 16 A play path can be induced by a well dened strategy satisfy-
ing the one-deviation property if and only if it belongs to XXF. Moreover,
the outcomes that are implementable via any such strategy are contained in
[XXF]=
133.2 Algorithmic Considerations
The problem with the solution concepts is often their computability. Such
questions are particularly acute here since the set of paths ¹ [ is typically
innite. A convenient algorithm for computing the relevant elements of the
largest consistent collection of paths is now provided.
First we simplify the paths without losing any of their important proper-
ties. We say that ¹ | =( | 0 >===>| O)2 ¹ [ i sareduction of ¹ { =( { 0 >===>{ N)2 ¹ [
if {0 = |0, {N = |O> and f|ogµf { n g =Then ¹ | i safull reduction of ¹ { i fi ti sa
reduction of ¹ { and the only reduction of ¹ | is ¹ | itself. That is, ¹ | contains only
those nodes of ¹ { that are needed to travel from {0 to {N. A full reduction of
¹ { need not be unique.
For any set ¹ E of paths, denote by ( ¹ E)IUthe collection of all full reductions
of the elements in ¹ E= By the denition of reduction, if ¹ E itself consists of
fully reduced paths, then ( ¹ E)IU= ¹ E=
Let XF0




IU) for all m =1 >===
. Denote the ultimate uncovered set of fully reduced paths by XXFIU =
XF1
IU=
Since the length of a fully reduced path is at most j[j> the algorithm is
computable in nite time (not necessarily in polynomial, though.)
Now we argue that the algorithm produces equilibrium strategy recom-
mendations. Moreover, it characterizes all simple strategy recommendations.
Proposition 17 (XXF)IU =XXFIU µXXF=




IU µXFw¡1=By the denition of covering, since { is covered in XFw¡1 it
must be covered in XF
w¡1
IU> a contradiction. Thus XFw
IU µXFw> for all w=
S t e p2: We now prove that XFw
IU =( XFw)IUforall w= By Step 1, XFw
IU =
(XFw
IU)IU µ (XFw)IU for all w= For other direction, let w be the rst stage
when ¹ { 2 (XFw)IU nXFw
IU= By assumption (XFw¡1)IU µ XF
w¡1
IU= By the
denition of covering, since { is covered in XF
w¡1
IU it must be covered in
XFw¡1> a contradiction. Thus (XFw)IU µXFw
IU> for all w=
S t e p3 : Combining steps 1 and 2, we have (XFw)IU = XFw
IU µ XFw for
all w= Thus also (XXF)IU =XXF IUµXXF=
Since, By Proposition 17, (XXF)IU = XXFIU> it follows that the out-
comes that can be implemented with XXF coincide with the outcomes that
can be implemented with XXFIU.
Proposition 18 [XXFIU]= [ XXF]=
14Thus the algorithm provides an unbiased prediction of the outcomes that
can be implemented in equilibrium of the original game.
4 Coalitional Interpretation
4.1 Relation to the Largest Consistent Set
The now we develop the solution concept succested by Chwe (1994). First,
an outcome | directly dominates { if there is a coalition V such that | 2
IV({) and | ÂV {= An outcome | indirectly dominates { if there is a pair
(¹ {> ¹ V) of paths of outcomes and coalitions such that ¹ { =( { 0 >{ 1>===>{N) and
¹ V =( V 0 >===>V N¡ 1), and such that {0 = { >|={ N >and {n+1 2 IVn({n) from
{ to | such that {N ÂVn {n, for all n =0 >===>N ¡ 1=
Set F µ [ i saconsistent set if F consists of all { for which the following
holds: if | 2 IV({)> then there is } 2 F that indirectly dominates | such
that { Âl } for some l 2 V. Chwe (1994) showed that a consistent set exists
and the largest consistent set is unique.
Chwe*s solution, even though one of the most used coalitional solutions,
has been subject to criticism that the indirect dominance need not be credi-
ble: the path of blockings may be deviated by a subset of an active coalition.
The following example is due to Xue (1998): (where {
V ¡! | re ects the








F i g u r e3
Consider the game in Figure 3, where Q = f1>2g, [ = fd>e>f>gg> and
If1g(d)=f d>eg>I f 2 g ( e )=f e>fg>I f 1 > 2 g ( e )=f e>gg> and in all other cases
IV({) is just a singleton= Recall that in our model { is implemented if { 2






In the set up of Figure 3, the largest consistent set chooses fd>f>gg=However,
the largest consistent set is too large since it is not reasonable to predict that
g is ever chosen: when d is the status quo, the "predicted" outcomes are
fd>gg>the latter in the case when coalition f1>2g forms in status quo e= But
note that once node e is reached and the coalition f1>2g is about to form,
player 2 would renege and choose the option f instead. Hence, g should not
be considered as a conceivable outcome.
This example suggests that indirect dominance over outcomes does not
su¢ce but rather, also dominance over paths must be taken under consider-
a t i o n .A si nS e c t i o n3 ,d e  ne a dominance relation over paths of outcomes.
Relative to that model, the only addtional subtlety now concerns when to
allow a coalition to activate if there already is an active coalition. We pro-
ceed as suggested by the example above, and allow coalition to interfere a
path if it is allowed to move at the current node and if it is a subcoalition of
the currently active coalition. This assumption is motivated by the idea that
members of an active coalition need to communicate, and hence they can
coordinate into a smaller di¤erent coalition. The question is of determining
which coalition serves as a status quo coalition in nodes through which the
play evolves. After this choice not all coalitions are in a symmetric position
since, due to unmodeled coordinative activity between coalition members,
they are not furnished with similar communication preparedness. The solu-
tion then asks which coalitional plays are consistent with the choice of active
coalitions. In a simple recursive game this is not an issue since there is only
one potential decision maker at a time.
Proposition 19 Let FFS be a consistent collection of paths. Then [FFS]
is a consistent set.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that [FFS] is not a consistent set. Then
there is an { 2 [FFS]> an V> a n da|2I V ( { )such that [¹ |] ÂV {> for all
¹ | 2 FFS such that |0 = |= But this contradicts the assumption that there
is ¹ } 2 XXF such that (¹ })={and that XXF =XF(XXF)=
16However, [XXF]i sn o tt h el a r g e s tc o n s i s t e n ts e t :i ti sar e  nement of the
largest consistent set. One example is the game in Figure 3: XXF consists of
f(d)>((e>f)>f2g)>(f)>(g)g, thus if d is the status quo, then d is implemented,
if e is the status quo, then f is implemented, and if f (or g) is the status quo,
then f (or g) is implemented.
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Here Q = f1>2>3g, [ = fd>e>f>gg> and If1g(d)=f d>eg>I f 2 g ( e )=f e>fg>





The largest consistent set is fd>e>gg=However, the largest consistent collec-
tion of paths XXFconsistent only of the path (d>e>f>g)and hence [XXF]=
f g g =
4.2 Path Stability
Xue (1998) is based on the same idea as this paper; that what is crucial is the
stability of paths rather than outcomes. He uses von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set approach to identify paths that are robust against deviations. In
the analysis that proceeds, perfect foresight is captured explicitly by the
17"situation with perfect foresight":4 Assume that alternative d 2 [ is the
status quo. Consider a path ¹ { and some of its node {n. Assume that a
coalition V can replace {n by some alternative | 6= {n+1. In doing so, V is
aware of that the set of feasible paths from | is ¹ [| := f¹ | 2 ¹ [ : |0 = |g.
In contemplating such a deviation from |, however, members of V base their
decision on comparing paths that might befollowed by rational and farsighted
individuals at |. Let VE(|) ½ ¹ [| denote this standard of behavior.
The following denition describes a conservative approach to stable stan-
dard of behavior.
Denition 20 An VE is conservatively stable if it is
(1) internally stable: for all { 2 [> if ¹ { 2 VE({)> then there is no |, n>
and V such that {n+1 6= | >|2I V ( { n ) >and [¹ |] ÂV [¹ {]> for all ¹ | 2 VE(|),
(2) externally stable: for all { 2 [> if ¹ { 2 ¹ [{ nVE({)> then there is |, n>
and V such that | 2 IV({n)>{ n +1 6= |> and [¹ |] ÂV [¹ {]> for all ¹ | 2 VE(|)=
To see most clearly the relationship between our solution concept and the
conservatively stable standard of behavior, let us rewrite the denition of a
consistent collection of paths in the form, that is equivalent to the original
denition:
Denition 21 (Consistent collection of paths II) A coalitional consis-
tent collection of paths FFS satises
(1) internal stability: if ¹ { 2 FFS> then there is no | and n such that
{n+1 6= |, and such that {n+1 2 IV0({n) implies | 2 IV({n) and [¹ |] ÂV [¹ {]
for all ¹ | 2 ¹ [| \ FFS> for some V µ V0>
(2) external stability: if ¹ { 2 ¹ [ n FFS> then there is | and n such that
{n+1 6= |, and such that {n+1 2 IV0({n) implies | 2 IV({n) and [¹ |] ÂV [¹ {]
for all ¹ | 2 ¹ [| \ FFS> for some V µ V0=
From this denition it is clear that the key di¤erence between the solu-
tion concepts is that a FFS requires that the deviant coalition must be a
subcoalition of an active coalition. This requirement prevents pathological
4Referring to Greenberg*s (1991) Theory of Social Situations.











The unique conservative standard of behavior is empty, and hence gives no
guidance how the play evolves. However, there are two FFSs: f(d>e)>e>fg
and f(d>f)>e>fg.
4.3 Blocking in Real Time
In this section we interpret our results in the framework of dynamic coalition
formation by Konishi and Ray (2003).5 A model is captured by a tuple
hQ>]>x>(IV)V22Q>i where [ is now interpreted as a set of states and Q
the set of players, xl({) as the utility of player l in state {, and IV({) µ [
such that { 2 IV({) is the set of states achievable by a one-step coalitional
move by a coalition V from {> for all { 2 [> and for all V 2 2Q.
Parameter  2 (0>1) is a discount factor, and player l*sp a y o ¤f r o ma
sequence of states ¹ { = {0>===>{ wmay be written as
Pw
=0 
xl({)= Let K be
the set of all histories of states ({0>===>{ w)such that {0 = {¤. Aa deterministic
process of coalition formation (PCF) is now a function j : K ! [, capturing
the transitions from one history to another. These transitions will be induced
by coalitions who stand to benet from them. A PCF j induces a value
function yl for each l 2 Q. This value function captures the innite horizon
payo¤ to a player starting from any state history (k>{) under the Markov
5For a similarly oriented approach, see Gomez and Jehiel (2005).
19process j. By the standard observation, the value function for l is the unique
solution to the functional equation
yl(k>{) = (1 ¡ )[xl({)+yl(k>{>j(k>{))]=
Let j0(k)=j ( k )and jw(k)=j ( k>j w(k))> for all w =1 >=== . We focus on
PCFs that are absorbing: starting from any history k there is wk and state {
such that for all w ¸ wk>
j
w(k)={=
That is, starting from any history, the strategy does not cycle in the long
run: it converges to some state and stays there. Absorbing PCFs have the
great benet that one can approximate the long term payo¤s of the players
by their direct, short term payo¤s.
We are now in a position to dene protable moves. A move | 2 IV({)
is e¢cient for V if there is no } 2 IV({) such that yV(k>}) Ay V ( k>|)=
Following Konishi and Ray (2003), dene a deterministic equilibrium process
of coalition formation (EPCF) as follows: (i) if j(k>{)=|6 ={> then there
is V such that | 2 IV({) and
yV(k>{>|)¸y V(k>{>{)=
(ii) if there is a } and an V such that } 2 IV({) and
yV(k>{>})Ay V( k>{>|)>
then j(k>{)=|6= {is e¢cient for V0 such that
yV0(k>{>})Ay V 0 ( k>{>{)=
Konishi and Ray (2003) showed the existence of a random, stationary
EPCF. Here we argue that there is also deterministic EPCF if one drops
stationarity assumption, i.e. allows j to be dependent on the history k> and
not only on the current state { as the stationary PCF does=
Denote by
¹ j(k)=( j
0 ( k ) >===>j
w k(k))
the paths of states that will matrialize according to PCF j starting from
history k> and by
¹ j(K)=f ¹ {:¹ j ( k )=¹ {> for some k 2 Kg
Proposition 22 There is 
¤ such that if A
¤ , then, for any FFS, there
is a deterministic and absorbing EPCF j such that ¹ j(K)=FFS.
20Proof. Fix FFS and construct j from it by letting jw({0>===>{n¡1>{ n)={ nif
{n¡1 = {n> for all w =0 >1 >===> and if | 6= {n+1 such that ¹ { =( { 0 >===>{N) 2
FFS> then jw({0>===>{ n>|)=| w >for all w =1 >===>O>such that xl(|O) · xl({N)
for some l 2 V such that | 2 IV({n)= We need to show that such j is consistent
with (i) and (ii) of EPCF.
Suppose, on the contrary, that j violates (i) under ¹ { 2 FFS. Then there
is {n+1 6= {n such that {n+1 2 IV({n) and
yl(k>{ n>{ n +1) ?y l ( k>{ n>{ n)> for some l 2 V= (8)
But since yl(k>{ n>{ n) = (1 ¡ )[xl({n)+xl({n)+
2 x l ( { n )+===]=x l ( { n ) =
By continuity, yl(k>{ n>{ n +1) ¼ xl({N)= But then (8) con i c t s( ??).
Suppose that j violates (i) under ¹ { 2 FFS. Since, bycontinuity, yl(k>{ n>|)¼
x l(| O)such that xl(|O) · xl({N) for some l 2 V0 µ V such that | 2 IV({n)
and {n+1 2 IV({n)> it follows that {n+1 is e¢cient for V.
5 E¢ciency
The classic question in coalitional analysis concerns e¢ciency. An argument
that goes under the label of Coase theorem says that an outcome that results
from unrestricted coalitional bargaining will always be e¢cient: otherwise a
coalition would block the outcome by proposing another outcome that all the
players prefer. This intuition is not insu¢cient in the current framework.
Consider a game in Figure 6. The payo¤s to three players Q = f1>2>3g
as depicted in di¤erent nodes. Each shaded node is Pareto dominated by
some other node, rew ected by the arrow from the node to another node.
At each node all subcoalitions are entitled to move the game to any node.
Thus there are no a priori restrictions on what the coalitions can achieve.
Nevertheless there is a FFS such that [FFS] consists only of the sheded
nodes (2>0>1)> (1>2>0)> or (0>1>2). The construction is as follows: if, say,
(2>0>1) is blocked by Q to (3>1>2), then (3>1>2) is blocked by f2g to (1>2>0),
which remains unblocked and becomes implemented. A similar consideration
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Thus there is nothing inconsistent with the idea that an ine¢cient out-
come becomes implemented, even if bargaining opportunities are unrestricted.
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